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    This paper examines how the turmoil in international financial crises that hit the world 
impacts the causation from trade to different sectoral shares from (1960-1990) and (1990-
2012) respectively by taking year 1990 as the threshold level and emphasizes on how post 
1990 crises can have an impact on the causal effect from trade to production shares of different 
sectors of the economy for all the developing economies. This paper has found no evidence 
that trade mattered for the sectoral shares and financial crises did not matter regarding how 
trade affects or doesn’t affect the sectoral shares.   
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 Table1: The impact of openness on the sectors of production in developing countries: fixed 
effects estimates, 1960– 2012 
 
 
Note: Standard errors are expressed in parentheses. The above results have been estimated using 
country fixed estimates. 
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Table2: The impact of openness on the sectors of production in developing countries: fixed effects 
estimates, 1960– 1990 
 
Note: Standard errors are expressed in parentheses. The above results have been estimated using 
country fixed estimates. 
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Table3: The impact of openness on the sectors of production in developing countries: fixed effects 
estimates, 1990– 2012 
 
 
Note: Standard errors are expressed in parentheses. The above results have been estimated using 
country fixed estimates. 
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Table 4: The impact of openness on the non-agricultural sectors: fixed effects estimates, 1960– 
2012 
 
 
 
Note: Standard errors are expressed in parentheses. The above results have been estimated using 
country fixed estimates. 
 
   
 
Independent Variables
GDP per capita 0.102*** 0.097*** 0.100***
(0.029) (0.035) (0.036)
Trade Share 0.009 -0.008
(0.016) (0.017)
Lagged Trade Share 0.040** 0.041**
(0.017) (0.017)
World Sector Value Added/GDP
1960-1964 -0.008 -0.004 -0.003
(0.070) (0.069) (0.069)
1965-1969 -0.012
(0.025)
1975-1979 -0.002
(0.016)
1980-1984 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
1985-1989 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
1990-1994 -0.038** -0.036** -0.035**
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
1995-1999 -0.058*** -0.057*** -0.056***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
2000-2004 -0.043*** -0.040*** -0.039***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
2005-2009 -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.053***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
_cons 0.136*** 0.133*** 0.132***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Number of observations 473 414 411
R2 0.140 0.141 0.144
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Non agricultural value added/GDP
Dependent Variables
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION           
     Financial crises including overshooting exchange rates, withdrawal of foreign capital, internal 
credit crunches has had different effects on global trade. Several studies discusses the impact of 
financial crisis on the developing countries  suggesting that although there will be countries which 
are going to be adversely affected there will also be countries which will be less affected and may 
recover sooner than expected. Given the financial origin of the crisis, financial constraints and 
liquidity shortages have also been suggested to be determinants. Even in normal times, finance is 
particularly important for trade for different reasons. McKibbin and Stoeckel (2009) emphasizes 
the larger contraction of trade in durables relative to its production during the crisis. (Iacovone and 
Zavacka; 2009) suggests how export growth is slower in sectors susceptible to external finance 
past banking crises. Sector specific shocks like fall in the demand for semiconductors in 1996 and 
adverse trade fluctuations also led to the trade worsening situation during 1996-1997 (Corsetti, 
Pesenti, Roubini; 1999). According to, Amiti and Weinstein (2009), following the banking crisis, 
one third of the 1993 Japanese export collapse is explained by the decrease in financing. Borchert 
and Mattoo (2009) document that trade in services was more resilient than trade in manufactured 
goods during the global financial crisis. The Financial Crisis of 2008 raises enough analytical and 
empirical issues to keep interested economists busy for the foreseeable future (Dwyer and Tkac; 
2009). There are stronger spillover effects between exchange rates and stock returns during the 
2007–2009 financial crisis. According to (Whitt, 1996), the Mexican Peso Crisis led to high 
inflation thus leading to severe recession in Mexico. 
       (Dodzin and Vamvakidis;2003) employs estimates from a panel of 92 developing countries 
from 1960–2000 to investigate the impact of international trade on the allocation of production 
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across sectors in developing countries. Their study suggests that an increase in openness to trade 
leads to an increase in the industrial value added share of production at the expense of the 
agricultural share. My value added to  this paper is that I want to examine whether the turmoil in 
international financial crisis that hit the world during the last three decades can determine the 
causation from trade to different sectoral shares. To capture this, I extend the data period till 2012 
and divide it into two sub periods: (1960-1990) and (1990-2012) respectively. Since, the 
consequences of post 1990 crises had a much remarkable impact on the developing economies, 
my primary concern, henceforth, is to inspect in detail how it  significantly affects the causation 
effect and what are the policy implications. My results differ from what the authors have deduced. 
This paper has found no evidence that trade mattered for the sectoral shares. Hence, my results are 
in contrast with (Dodzin and Vamvakidis;2003) and this may be due to the inclusion of all the 
developing countries in my sample, different data period, employing different empirical 
specification being time fixed effects or due to the different time periods. 
     The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the previous studies how 
financial crises led to contraction of global trade and hence had a severe impact on trade. Section 
3 discusses the various financial crises the world economy faced in the recent years. Section 4 
examines how the turmoil in international financial crisis that hit the world impacts the causation 
from trade to different sectoral shares. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Section 6 
concludes and highlights some implications of the results. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
        A free trade world enables nations to focus on their core competitive advantage(s), thereby 
maximizing economic output. This has been a crux of most theories supporting the infant industry 
argument which states that developing countries are justified to put tariffs on imports if they are 
seeking to develop new industries. While the world is becoming more globalized day by day; under 
the current form of globalization, neoliberalism, free trade and open markets are coming under 
much criticism. (Dodzin and Vamvakidis;2003) examines the impact of openness to international 
trade on the production shares of agriculture, industry and services in developing economies by 
addressing the concerns whether developing countries become more agricultural after opening to 
international trade. The paper focuses on production movements across aggregate sectors of 
production. Their study suggests that developing countries who opened up to international trade 
experienced an increase in industrial production share at the expense of agriculture and henceforth, 
concludes that trade leads developing countries to industrialization in contrast to infant industry 
argument. Their evidence suggested that production pattern of a developing economy towards the 
industrial sector was one of the channels through which the positive openness growth connection 
worked when they opened up to international trade. I want to extend this paper by including a 
longer time period and a much larger sample of countries. The sole purpose of the extension is to 
focus on how global economic crises post 1990 influence the results of estimation. 
       Throughout the recent years, the world economy has experienced an upsurge of remarkable 
economic crisis in history whose effects were not only economic but also political, social and 
environmental and affected all the sectors worldwide. It gave rise to acute instability and 
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proliferated the financial vulnerability of countries, especially developing countries open to the 
international capital markets, following early 1980’s financial liberalization. The ramifications in 
terms of cumulative production losses were more severe for post 1990 crises. Most of the economic 
crisis that happened pre-1990 were largely related to developed economies. During the post 1990’s 
and due to the advent of globalization, economic crises became more integrated on the world scale 
and developing countries such as Togo could feel the effect of a crisis in Japan. (Bricongne, 
Fontagné, Gaulier , Taglioni, Vicard;2011) document how global economic crises led to a severe 
decline in international trade. Freund (2009) and Levchenko (2010) suggests that during the global 
financial crisis, contraction in global trade relative to the decline in GDP, became more prominent, 
especially in recent downturns. Berman and Martin (2010) expounds the impact of crisis on 
African countries' exporting prospects. Moreover, such shocks exert a significant effect on asset 
prices and also on exchange rates (for example Andersen, 2003; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2005). 
Currency and banking crises occur frequently and have serious consequences. The relationship 
between currency and banking crises has attracted a lot of attention since the Asian financial crisis 
in 1997. When two crises occur at the same time (twin crises), their costs are high (Hutchison and 
Noy, 2005). (Dell'Ariccia, 2008) discusses the impact of banking and financial crises on economic 
outcomes such as sectoral growth or firms' planned R&D, employment and capital spending 
(Campello,2010. 
        Previous literature such as (Naude;2009) discusses the impact of financial crisis on the 
developing countries. It concludes the fact that although there will be countries which are going to 
be adversely affected there will also be countries which will be less affected and may recover 
sooner than expected. Smaller highly indebted countries significantly dependent upon the US 
economy will be most severely affected however; many developing countries like Brazil, China, 
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India will continue to grow at relatively strong rates. The developing world can limit the potential 
for future crisis by building appropriate financial system. (Levchenko, Lewis and Tesar;2010)  
analyzes the constitution of the collapse in international trade due to the recent recession from US 
economy perspective. Across different sectors, automobiles, durable industrial supplies, and 
capital goods experienced pronounced percentage drops in trade. Sectors that are used intensively 
as intermediate inputs and those with greater reductions in domestic output, experienced stark 
reductions in trade. By contrast, the paper unearths the fact that trade credit did not play a role in 
the recent trade collapse. (Eaton, Kortum, Neiman, and Romalis; 2015) concludes that a decline  
in the investment in durable manufacturing capital led to a reduction in spending on tradable 
sectors thus driving the collapse of trade. Changes in the composition of demand rather than 
increased trade protectionism led to the trade downfall. While one kind of shock is the most salient 
feature for the global trade collapse in some country while not for others. Their results suggest that 
productivity played a particularly large role in the case of China while an analysis focused on Japan 
concludes the same about aggregate demand. ( Barro;2001) analyzes the economic growth in East 
Asia pre and post financial crises and concludes that contraction in real GDP was severe compared 
to the five east Asian countries being Indonesia, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia  
which were less affected by the financial crisis.  
      While it is widely accepted that global economic crises had adverse consequences on economic 
growth and global trade, relatively little empirical work investigates how global crisis can 
influence the causal effect from trade to production shares of different sectors of the economy 
namely; agriculture, industry and services. More specifically, (Dodzin,Vamvakidis;2003) captures 
the effect of trade on sectoral production shares but  I want to examine whether the turmoil in 
international financial crisis that hit the world during the last three decades can determine the 
10 
 
 
 
causation from trade to different sectoral shares. To capture this, I extend the data period till 2012 
and divide it into two sub periods: (1960-1990) and (1990-2012) respectively. Since, the 
consequences of post 1990 crises had a much remarkable impact on the developing economies, 
my primary concern, henceforth, is to inspect in detail how it  significantly affects the causation 
effect and what are the policy implications. 
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CHAPTER 3 
BACKGROUND 
     The Asian Financial Crisis of the late 90s was deeper and more severe than the other financial 
crises. As a result, trade structure as well as economic growth of many developing countries was 
affected. Among the crises of the 1990s, it has certainly played a key role in generating the 
perception of a vanishing middle ground for exchange rate regimes in developing countries. The 
East Asian financial crisis is one of the sharpest financial crisis to hit the developing world. A 
partial list of recent analyses of the Asian crisis includes Alba et al. (1998), Dornbusch (1998), 
Feldstein (1998), and  Radelet and Sachs (1998).  Pomerleano (1998) looks at the corporate roots of 
the financial crisis in Asia. The long period of stagnation of the Japanese economy in the 1990’s 
led to a significant export growth slowdown from the Asian countries. Based on NIA data, the 
current account deficit in Thailand was over 6% of GDP virtually in each year in the 1990’s and 
approached 9% of GDP in 1999 and 1996. Similarly in Malaysia, deficit was above 10% of GDP in 
1993. Indonesia started the decade with a large imbalance (over 4% of GDP in 1990-1991) but the 
deficit shrank in 1992-1993. Later, the current account imbalance widened again, reaching 3-4% of 
GDP in 1995-1996. Of the remaining countries, Hong Kong started the decade with current account 
surpluses between 1990 and 1993 but situation worsened after 1993. In China, initially the current 
account was in surplus (1.5% of GDP) but turned into a 2% deficit in 1993 (Corsetti, Pesenti, Roubini; 
1999).  
The financial crisis that began in 2007 has created the greatest financial dislocations since the 
Great Depression of the 1930s. The final review-oriented paper by (Dooley, Hutchison;2009) 
addresses emerging markets in the crisis. Their study indicates that “a range of financial and real 
economic news emanating from the US had statistically and economically large impacts on 14 
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emerging markets and several news events uniformly moved markets”.   
Russia had more-or-less completed the privatization of its manufacturing and natural resource 
sectors by the end of 1997. In February 1998, the annual inflation rate dipped into the single digits. 
Privatization should have helped with stronger micro-foundations for growth. The conquest of 
inflation should have cemented macroeconomic credibility, lowered real interest rates, and spurred 
investment. Instead, Russia suffered a massive public debt-exchange rate-banking crisis just six 
months later, in August 1998 (B. Pinto, S. Ulatov; 2013). The economic impact of the Russian 
financial crisis had a large impact on the scaling behavior in Russian and Ukrainian economies 
(Vladimir A. Litvin). In 1998, Argentina entered what turned out to be a four-year depression, 
during which its economy shrank 28 percent. Argentina’s experience has been cited as an example 
of the failure of free markets and fixed exchange rates, among other things. The evidence does not 
support those views. Rather, bad economic policies converted an ordinary recession into a 
depression. Three big tax increases in 2000-2001 discouraged growth. The Argentine economy 
suffered a deep crisis during 2001 and 2002 In a series of blunders that made matters even worse, 
from December 2001 to early 2002, succeeding governments undermined property rights by 
freezing bank deposits; defaulting on the government’s foreign debt in a thoughtless manner; 
ending the Argentine peso’s longstanding link to the dollar; forcibly converting dollar deposits and 
loans into Argentine pesos at unfavorable rates; and voiding contracts (Saxton, 2003).  The 
Argentine crisis combined all evils put together. Social drama was excruciating, the state was in 
default, financial paralysis lingered on, and the fiscal situation was unresolved ( Murphy, Artana, 
and Navajas; 2003). Among recent studies which focuses on large-scale speculative episodes in the 
1990’s before the Asian crisis are (Eichengreen and Wyplosx ;1993) and (Buiter and Corsetti ; 
1998) on the European Monetary System crisis of (1992-1993), and (Sachs, Tornell and Velasco; 
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1996) on the Mexican peso crisis of 1994.  
         Since the Great Depression, the 1973 oil price shock with the accompanying 1973–74 stock 
market crash  was the first discrete event to have a persistent economic effect on oil exporting 
nations. (Balassa ;1985) conducts a study of 43 developing countries in the 1973–78 period of 
external shocks suggesting that differences in investment rates and the rate of growth of the labor 
force affect the intercountry differences in the rate of economic growth through initial trade policy 
stance and by the adjustment policies, as well as, by the level of economic development and the 
product composition of exports.  “On October 6, 1983, the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) was 
shut down for 18 days. In the fall of 1983, however, the sell-off was much greater than in the past, 
so that share purchases strained bank liquidity, raising concerns about overall banking stability. 
These concerns threatened to cause a run on deposits and a decline in foreign exchange reserves, 
which, together with other political considerations, led the government to close the Exchange” 
(Blass, Grossman;1996). 
       In the developing world, there were severe crises in both pre-1990 and post-1990. But the 
nature of crises was quite different between the two decades. In due course post 1990, most of the 
developing economies around the world encountered notable ups and downs. Compared to the pre-
1990 crises, the global maelstrom crises post-1990 immensely affected the developing economies 
and had a much significant effect in terms of both economic growth and its impact upon global 
trade. Hence, this paper takes the year 1990 as the threshold level and emphasizes on how post 
1990 crises can have an impact on the causal effect from trade to production shares of different 
sectors of the economy. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
        (Dodzin,Vamvakidis;2003) estimates the impact of trade on sectoral production shares using 
a panel regression with fixed effects. Hausman specification test justifies the use of fixed effects. 
I would cling to their empirical methodology and would estimate the same model for two different 
time periods (1960-1990) and (1990-2012). The data are in the form of 5 year averages. Also, since 
data is available for a larger sample of countries, I increased my sample size, thereby, including 
all developing countries. All data are from World Development Indicators. The three different 
sectors considered are; agriculture, industry and services. All the production shares are in real 
terms deflated by their deflators. Real trade share (real exports plus real imports over real GDP) is 
the main openness measure.  
The estimated model for each sector of production i is the following: 
ln(sij)t = cij+b1iln(gj)t+b2i(trj)t+b3i(trj)t-1+ βt 
where, cij are the country fixed effects, sij is the ratio of real value added over real GDP of sector i 
in country j, gj is the real per capita GDP in country j, βt is the year fixed effects , trj is the real 
trade share of country j. 
   (Dodzin,Vamvakidis;2003) captures the relationship how trade affects sectoral production 
shares. However, I want to examine how economic crisis influences the causal effect from trade 
to sectoral shares of production. I will run their same model but twice with two different time 
periods retaining all the explanatory variables. As estimated by (Dodzin,Vamvakidis;2003), I 
would expect that an increase in  
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trade openness rises the industrial value added share of production at the expense of agricultural 
share but the magnitude of b3 can increase or decrease as a consequence of the global crisis which 
had a significant effect on the world economy as a whole. Hence, the key coefficient of interest is 
b3. The relationship between trade and sij, henceforth, might be steeper or flatter. Nevertheless, as 
they suggested, I would expect the world production shares to have positive estimates for all 
sectors while GDP to have positive effect on the non-agricultural sector and negative for the 
agricultural sector. To deal with the problem of endogeneity, I test the robustness of the results 
using lagged trade share and also conduct Granger Causality tests.  
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
     Table 1 presents estimates from a regression with fixed effects, including the current and lagged 
trade shares for the full sample (1960-2012). The estimates for the variables are negative but not 
statistically significant for the agricultural sector when regressed individually with the exception 
of lagged trade share variable being positive though insignificant when both current and lagged 
trade share are included in the regression. The lagged trade share estimates are smaller than the 
current trade share estimates when both are included in the regression for the agricultural sector 
whereas in contrast to  (Dodzin,Vamvakidis;2003)  lagged share estimates are larger than the trade 
share estimates for both industrial and services sector particularly when both the variables are 
included in the regression . For the industrial sector, both trade share and lagged trade share 
variables are positive and statistically significant at 1% and 5% level respectively when each of 
them are regressed individually on industry value added over GDP whereas they are positive too 
but statistically insignificant when both are included in the regression. However, for the services 
sector, though statistically insignificant both trade share and lagged trade share have positive 
estimates with the exception of trade share having a negative sign when both the variables are 
included in the regression. The estimates of the other variables are as expected with the exception 
of the world sector value added being negative for some sectors for different time periods. 
     Table 2 presents estimates from a regression with fixed effects, including the current and lagged 
trade shares for the sample period of (1960-1990). The estimates for the variables are positive for 
trade share and negative for the lagged trade share respectively for the agricultural sector. Both the 
variables are statistically insignificant. Again, in contrast to (Dodzin and Vamvakidis;2003) , in 
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the agricultural and services sector the estimates of the lagged share are smaller than the estimates 
of trade share whereas it is not the case for industrial sector when both are included in the 
regression. For the industrial sector, both the variables have positive estimates but insignificant 
when regressed individually and also jointly. The estimates for both the variables are negative but 
statistically insignificant for the services sector. The estimates of other variables being GDP during 
this time period is not as expected but statistically significant for agricultural and industrial sectors. 
Additionally, the estimates of world sector value added are different for different time periods for 
all the three sectors. 
      Table 3 presents estimates from a regression with fixed effects, including the current and 
lagged trade shares for the sample period of (1990-2012). Neither lagged trade share nor trade 
share for this sample period are statistically significant which again differ from (Dodzin and 
Vamvakidis;2003). The estimates for the variables are negative for trade share and positive for the 
lagged trade share respectively for both agricultural and services sector. For both the agricultural 
and services sector, lagged trade share estimates are smaller than trade share estimates in particular 
when both the variables are included in the regression. The estimates for the two variables in the 
industrial sector are positive with the exception of trade share being negative when both the 
variables are included in the regression. The estimates of the other variables are as expected with 
the exception of the world sector value added being negative for some sectors for different time 
periods. 
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      Table 4 shows the estimates of the impact of openness on the non-agricultural sector which is 
aggregation of industrial and services sector. It presents estimates from a regression with the ratio 
of non-agricultural value added over GDP as the dependent variable. Trade share and lagged trade 
share have positive estimates with only lagged trade share being statistically significant. 
     Pre and post 1990 there is no significant effect of trade on any of the sectoral shares suggesting 
that the financial crises did not matter regarding how trade affects or doesn’t affect the sector 
shares. This paper has found no evidence that trade mattered for the sectoral shares. Hence, my 
results are in contrast with (Dodzin and Vamvakidis;2003) and this may be due to the inclusion of 
all the developing countries in my sample, different data period, employing different empirical 
specification being time fixed effects or due to the different time periods. Policy makers in 
developing countries try to promote industrialization through trade channel but this policy might 
not be really effective because trade doesn’t really impact the different sectors of the economy. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
     While it is widely accepted that global economic crises had adverse consequences on economic 
growth and global trade, relatively little empirical work investigates how global crisis can 
influence the causal effect from trade to production shares of different sectors of the economy 
namely; agriculture, industry and services. There is no evidence that associations between trade 
and the sector shares differ pre and post-1990 hence suggesting that financial crises did not matter 
regarding how trade affects or doesn’t affect the sector shares. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
Countries in the regressions 
 
 
Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Dem. Rep. of Congo, 
Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Coˆ te d’Ivoire, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, 
Kenya, Korea, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua 
New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab 
Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, 
Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe, American Samoa, Cambodia, Fiji, Kiribati, Korea, Dem Republic, 
Lao, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Palau Samoa, Timor-Leste, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Vanautu, Vietnam, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakstan, Kosovo, Kyrgz Republic, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro 
Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Belize, CubaDominica, Grenada, St.Lucia, 
St.Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, West Bank and 
Gaza, Afghanistan, Bhutan, Maldives, Angola, Central African Republic, Eritrea, Liberia, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Somalia, South Sudan. 
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